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 Why is it important to study the distribution of power in Lebanon, whose theoretical 
framework is offered by ―Critical Geopolitics‖? In an attempt to answer this question we 
must analyze the distribution of settlements of different minorities, and communities, which 
will help us understand the impact they have on Lebanon, and the Geopolitical pressure that 
the war in Syria from the north side is presenting, and the pressure that could erupt again if a 
war between Hezbollah and Israel from the southern flank starts once again. 
This paper also provides a description and an explanation of the confessional community map 
of Lebanon. To do this, we will use the main ideological and cultural factors that affect the 
complex interplay of local and regional factors on Lebanese security and defense concerns. 
Using the theoretical framework of ―Critical Geopolitics‖ we will present the mosaic of 
communities that reflects the Geopolitical pressures experienced by this country from all its 
flanks and how domestic and foreign policies respond to this Geopolitical pressure. 
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Introduction 
 Since the War in Syria started in January 2011, the relationship between Lebanon and 
Syria became more dangerous due to traditional links between the two countries. In fact, 
Lebanon is slowly getting closer to becoming involved in this war because of the 
participation of the Shia militia of Hezbollah, in favor of Bashar Al Assad‘s regime.  This 
participation is further proof of the escalation of tension between the Shia and Sunni 
communities that we are currently witnessing within the Middle East. 
  Because of this war we are obliged to pay attention to the connection between 
religion and power. Indeed, the religious factor can be used to explain how power is 
distributed in a certain area or territory. Be that as it may, we cannot afford to forget that both 
countries are bound by a group of minorities, which consist of different communities, each of 
which has a different perception of the country, its reliance on power, and its understanding 
of democracy. 
 When we talk about Lebanon we have to consider the many problems that the country 
is facing, in regard to stability and security; such as, state weakness, sectarian tensions, 
clashes at the border areas, political assassinations, abductions, as well as the impact of the 
refugee flows from Syria, which all add up to make a highly complicated situation. Beirut‘s 
inabilities to cope with these problems further highlight how weak and unstable the situation 
of successive governments have been in this nation. 
 This is a country where political instability and chronic insecurity linger because of so 
little attention to remedy the confessional system was introduced since its independence in 
1943. Likewise, successive governments‘ inabilities to emend the political Power-Sharing 
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mechanism, edified around 1943 National Charter, underscored its ineffectiveness. The 
existence of large coalitions of political parties, the system of mutual veto, proportional 
representation of different religious groups, and the segmentation of autonomy, all have 
caused Lebanon to suffer from a social and political instability that could be critical for any 
future system. We also cannot forget the weakness that the state itself represents, which is 
justified by the same regulatory framework that does not allow it to operate normally. 
 The situation that Lebanon is going through at present is a good example of what has 
been dominating the country as the revenge of geography, postulated by Robert Kaplan 
(2009). Lebanon's location is establishing itself as one of the guidelines to understanding the 
permanent instability that is constantly present. In fact, many geopolitical factors affect the 
increase of insecurity, as well as the increase in demands in the field of defense. Therefore, 
we opt to use a critical approach of conventional Geopolitics if we want to carry out a more 
efficient analysis. Thus, it may be useful to develop a theoretical framework offered by 
"Critical Geopolitics"
274
, which will help us draw a map of the distribution of power while 
taking the ideological and cultural factors into account along with its geographical nature. 
 This study analyzes the distribution of settlements of different minorities and 
communities to understand their impact on Lebanon and the Geopolitical pressure that the 
war in Syria from the north side is inflicting, and the pressure that could erupt again if a war 
between Hezbollah and Israel starts once again, in the south. 
 My aim is to describe and explain the confessional community map of Lebanon. To 
do this, we will look at the main ideological and cultural factors that affect the complex 
interplay of local and regional factors on Lebanese security and defense concerns. After 
understanding these factors, we will be able to see a mosaic of different communities that 
represent the country and reflect Geopolitical pressure experienced from all sides; and how 
policies, domestic and foreign, as well as other regional socio-political factors that the 
Lebanese are subjected to, lead citizens to respond to this dilemma from a geopolitical 
perspective. 
 This paper suggests the vital importance that is presented by the distribution of 
different communities in Lebanon, based on confessionalism, to better understand the current 
political game of alliances and rivalries displayed in it. For this reason, we are going to 
consider territoriality as a strategy and as it manifests itself (Novak, 2011:742). Such an 
approach, will allow one to better understand power politics, as practiced by different local 
actors. 
 Once, we have submitted the incidence of confessionalism and communalism on the 
socio-political reality of Lebanon, and after the theoretical framework of ―critical 
Geopolitics‖ is clarified, we are able to get into the analysis of the conflict between Hezbollah 
and Israel from a critical and Geopolitical viewpoint. Below, we tackle the importance 
presented by both, communitarianism as well as confessionalism, in the analysis of the 
northern border between Lebanon and Syria. This will allow us to understand how the 
settlements of the different communities in the border areas would partly explain the 
geopolitical pressure experienced by the Lebanese. This geopolitical pressure would have 
influence on the patterns of Lebanese security in the context of its defense. Finally, we 
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 We can consider the born of this discipline when the book of Simon Dalby was published in 1990 under the 
title: ―Creation the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics‖, Guilford, New York. 
In general we can point out three main textbooks where you can find a definition of Critical Geopolitics. The 
textbooks are the next: 
Agnew, John.Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics, 2
nd
 Edition, Routledge, London, 2003; Doods, Klaus. 
Global Geopolitics: A critical introduction, Harlow: Pearson, 2005; Ó Tuathail et Al. The Geopolitical Reader‖ 
2
nd
 Edition, Routledge, New York, 2006. 
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address some conclusions concerning the Lebanese Geopolitics trends in the medium and 
long terms. 
 
Critical Geopolitics and the distribution of Power : The incidence of Confessionalism 
 Lebanon is sublimely defined by critical Geopolitics. A new way, that takes into 
account not only the purely geographical elements but also notes the economic, 
environmental, and cultural elements as well
275
, avow to its intractable dilemmas. Indeed, the 
main purpose of this new perception of Geopolitics consists in gathering the ideas of the 
political and symbolic and territorial boundaries that exist in a specific territory. In this way, 
we will be able to understand properly the political space as, highlighted by the contribution 
of Dr. John Agnew who linked the meaning of knowledge with the notion of space. Dr. 
Agnew provides us with five new manners to use the geography of knowledge to understand 
what is happening in the world of politics. For our study, we are going to focus on the 
hegemonic thinking (Agnew, 2007:142-146), because it will help us understand the 
competition of ideas and practices concerning the use of power in specific areas keeping the 
religious factor in mind. 
 Geopolitics cannot be understood by only paying attention to geographical factors and 
the behavior of the State as an actor in charge to execute sovereignty (Agnew, 1994). Yves 
Lacoste suggests an explanatory theory for understanding the concept of Geopolitics where 
he argues that it is necessary to study the rivalries of power that are taking place in a certain 
place (Lacoste, 1995:3). Lacoste points out that it is essential to get away from the 
geographical determinism. For this reason we are going to use for our analysis the 
contribution of Robert Sack, concerning the concept of territoriality. For him, territoriality is 
―an attempt by an individual or social group to affect, influence, and control people, 
phenomena and relationships by delimiting, and asserting control over a geographical area‖ 
(Sack, 1986:19).  Our main goal is to try to analyze the control over a certain territory using 
the ideological and religious factors.  
 The idea is to consider political ideology and political culture prevailing in each 
geographic area to better understand the distribution of power and the formation and 
consolidation of identities and feelings of belonging to a community. In order to do a right 
analysis of the cultural influence we have to take into consideration the definition of 
Geopolitical culture provided by O‘Loughlin, ÓTuathail and Kolossov. Indeed, they 
understand Geopolitical culture as a combination of factors among which we could stress, for 
instance, on the network of power that exist in a given society, debates concerning national 
identities, the kinds of geopolitical codes, the varieties of foreign policy measures devised by 
the state, etc…(O‘Loughlin et Al., 2005:324). All these factors will provide the basic 
information to understand how culture affects the distribution of power based on ideology.  
 Therefore, we will explain the importance of territorial settlements based on a 
community identity and / or present religious landscape, in relation to the Lebanese security 
and defense. In this sense, it‘s important to remember that the civil war changed considerably 
the location of the sectarian composition of the population. This issue is very important to 
take into account because it will help us understand the framework of alliances and rivalries 
that exist nowadays throughout Lebanon. Furthermore, Lebanon is presented as a special case 
study in order to go in depth concerning Beirut as a politicized space of competing meanings. 
Indeed, we can talk about ―Beirutization‖ in comparison with the ―Balkanization process‖ as 
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 We are facing a concept constantly updated due to a number of factors, among which we should highlight the 
phenomenon of globalization Thanks of this, we are obliged to reconsider our conception related to the relation 
between sovereign and territory. In fact, we cannot conceive Geopolitics as a simple geopolitical struggle or 
competition for territory. For instance, we are astonished attending to the phenomena of international terrorism 
which attempts to expand globally a particular ideology. 
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a space of destruction and sectarian warfare (Nagel, 2002:718). Consequently, how power 
centers operate in certain regions gains additional value, which assist in understanding the 
ways critical Geopolitics affect the game of rivalries on specific spaces. 
 Confessionalism‘s predominance and the Lebanese State‘s weaknesses are making us 
think about the problem of effective sovereignty in relation to the legitimate exercise of 
power and authority. Concerning this idea we have to mention differences that exist between 
de jure and de facto sovereignty. Indeed, we can consider the fact that the Lebanese State has 
the jure sovereignty provided for being a State. On paper, Lebanon should enjoy a full 
sovereignty over all its territory and population. If we conform to the reality, we have to 
admit that Lebanon as a ―State‖ is sharing its quotas of sovereignty with the 19 communities 
which are playing on the Lebanese socio-political scenario and with some fundamentalist and 
insurgent movements, which are out of Lebanese control as could be the case of Hezbollah, 
Al Qaeda, Fatah al Islam, and others. In addition, we have to mention the external 
dependence, assent of cooperation among Elites, corrupted practices that are socially 
accepted, poor level of infrastructure, and the independent refugees‘ camps (Agnew, 
2005:445). All of these factors are, for the Lebanese State, resting quotas of sovereignty. 
 I would hypothesize that three contextual factors have interacted to reproduce the 
dominant view about the distribution of power among the different communities who 
compound the Lebanese socio-political system. The first one is related to the impact of 
confessionalism and communalism on the Lebanese political system. As we already know, it 
relies on a kind of consociational democracy in which communalism assumes an important 
role in the political game. Thus, confessionalism is presented as the cornerstone to 
understanding the distribution of power between the nineteen communities that affect the 
Lebanese socio-political reality. In fact, the religious communities and not the people, as 
stated in the preamble of the Lebanese constitution, are those who exercise sovereignty. 
Therefore, the distribution of power is encouraged on ideological basis for the triumph of 
political confessionalism, and political Power-Sharing mechanism. In relation to this idea, we 
have to take into consideration the impact of some structural problems which are affecting the 
latent instability suffered by this country. Among these problems, and according to Professor 
Mounir Corm, we could point out:  feudalism, communalism, social sclerosis, corruption, 
political and economic patronage, foreign interventionism, etc... (Corm, 2012:89).  
 For this reason, it is crucial to delve into this distribution of power with ideological 
basis for understanding the transformations that settlements of different communities behave 
toward the establishment of alliances, military assistance, participation in armed conflicts, 
etc.... We will focus on critical geopolitics to elucidate how power is exercised in terms of the 
community that predominates in a specific geographical area. This will allow us to 
understand the pressure that Lebanon is subjected to from all its geopolitical sides. 
 The second factor is related to the geopolitical codes that are found when analyzing 
the Lebanese case. We can assert that the next geopolitical codes are increasing the impact of 
the first structure. In this sense, we have to point out that Lebanon would register a special 
and particular construction of us and them. The last point stresses the importance of carrying 
on a discourse analysis of political and religious elites, who are committed to establishing a 
stubborn defense of the identity of their respective communities. Indeed, the prevalence of 
any community‘s identity surpasses, national identity, which is probably unique to 
Lebanon
276
. However, if we consider the case of the "Party of God" (Hezbollah), the rhetoric 
of service to the state as a main force of resistance to the threat of invasion by Israeli forces 
falters now more than ever, especially when party leaders compromise the stability of 
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To go in depth in the exploring of the Elites role concerning the promotion of geopolitical discourses in 
regional conflicts, see: Ó Tuathail,Gearoid. Localizing geopolitics: Disaggregating violence and return in 
conflict regions, Political Geography, 29, 2010, pp. 256-265. 
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Lebanon with their participation in the war in Syria. In this sense, Hezbollah‘s speeches 
always pose the same question, either you are with me or you are against me. However, it is 
worth to point out that other communities display, more or less, a similar trend of behavior 
when they protect and promote their intrinsic interests. 
 The second geopolitical code that is bringing up importance within the Lebanese 
political system is related to the special construction of space, place, and time. In this sense, 
we have to refer to the civil war which took place between 1975 and 1990, where the leader 
of each community arose as a true "Lord of War" (Warlord), and politically and militarily 
controled a certain area of the country
277
. For this reason, warlords continue to perceive that 
the sources and use of power, in a specific territory are directly tied to their possession of said 
territories. Lebanon is still claiming certain areas based on a religious justification. In fact, 
Fatah al Islam, that is allegedly a cell of so-called Al Qaeda, operates on Lebanese soil 
through the use of Palestinian refugee camps. It aims to restore Palestine, and expel Jews 
from the Holy Land as a prerequisite for the imposition, through the use of violence, of the 
Islamic Ummah, as a community of believers throughout the Levant (Agnew, 2006:93). 
 The third structural geopolitical code concerns the Syrian war.  Actually, Lebanese 
stability is being compromised by what is happening in Syria, since the civil there has 
become a transnational conflict where the participation of the Shiite militia Hezbollah is 
compromising Lebanese security and defense. Such participation is based on the historic debt 
that Hezbollah seems to have towards Syria due to the political, military, and logistical Syrian 
support in its fight against Israel. Such participation would justify the need to defend the ―axis 
of resistance‖ composed of Iran, Syria and Hezbollah. It is presented as a clear example of the 
increase in the hostilities between Sunni radicalism and Shiite fundamentalism in the context 
of the destabilization that the region suffers from. In this regard, this war is bringing up the 
main geopolitical factors to understand how the geographical knowledge is being used by the 
states and powers. 
 In relation to the persistence of political imagination, we must emphasize the fact that 
the borders have gained unusual prominence, as they have emerged as one of the essential 
elements to understand the origin of the current conflict. In fact, the boundaries are presented 
as strategic elements where traditional geopolitics is founded, but are now used to explain the 
formation and implementation of certain policies of identities that can be used to cause the 
outbreak and continuation of armed conflict. 
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The leader of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) Walid Jumblat, who is also the leader of the Druze 
community, became strong in the Chouf area where he was one of the main protagonists of the well-known 
―War of the Mountain". This war took place between Druze and Christians for the control of certain parts of the 
Chouf. Concerning Dr. Samir Geagea, who is the current leader of the Lebanese Forces (FL), he was strong in 
the Bsharre area, and other northern areas of the country, and was accused due to his participation in the 
execution of four political killings during the civil war. In this case we have to highlight the assassination of the 
former Prime Minister Rashid Karami. Related to the current Lebanese parliament Speaker Mr. Nabih Berri, 
who was one of the leaders of the Shiite Amal movement, had the leading role in the heavy fighting with the 
Druze in Beirut area. Regarding the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader, General Michel Aoun, who as a 
commander of the Lebanese armed forces carried out numerous military episodes which were, sacrificed in vain 
the lives of many Lebanese soldiers. Finally, concerning the figure of Hezbollah leader, Sheikh Hassan 
Nasrallah, to point out that during this time his insurgent movement was responsible for numerous attacks on 
U.S. and French interests, as well as, the confrontation that occurred between Hezbollah and the Amal 
movement, both Shiites , for the control of certain areas near Beirut. These clashes provoked a rise of the 
political and sectarian violence in Lebanon. 
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     The critical geopolitics would be focused on identifying resources, practices, and 
representations that allow the control of territory and extraction of resources
278
. It also could 
allow us to understand the dynamics of struggle in relation to regional and global 
domination
279
. In the case of Lebanon, this point has demonstrated crucial importance 
because it is presented as a space where competition from opposing regional interests, 
different views of Islam, and different types of democracy are all noticed. 
 
The incidence of Confessionalism on the Lebanese socio-political reality 
 The impact of confessionalism can be noticed in every single field of Lebanese life. 
The Lebanese constitution recognizes the importance of the confessionalism on the Lebanese 
political system as communitarism and confessionalism appear as the cornerstones of the 
political system in place. There is a consociational democracy model that rests on a clear 
confessional political system. For the Lebanese case we could point out the link existing 
between sectarian politics and traditional political clientelism (Rigby, 2000:178). 
 Concerning the feasibility of this kind of political system, we have to pay attention to 
the regional factor because it can be used to cease the Elite consensus (Seaver, 2000:249), and 
therefore, it can involve the failure of the ―Power-Sharing‖ formula as a political mechanism. 
In relation to this, we have to stress that the current political situation is demonstrating the 
triumph of the tendency of dissociation at intra and inter confessional levels. Thus, at the 
present day, we have to pay attention to this challenge because if it finally happens, we will 
be able to see the end of the current stability. 
 Lebanon is nowadays the battle field between jihadist Sunni and Shia 
fundamentalism. In fact, we can consider that Lebanon is an example of what is happening in 
the whole region. As a matter of fact, it is impossible to understand what happens in Lebanon 
without understanding what is happening in the region and what are the international trends 
that influence this small and divided country. 
 To better highlight this complex game and assess the impact that confessionalism 
exerts on its own politics, we have to mention the constitutional articles, which justify this 
influence. The most important article where the legitimation of confessionalism can be found 
in articles 22
280
 and 24. The latter would make reference to the phenomenon of the religious 
families.  This concept would justify the distribution of major elective and administrative 
functions in response to the religious obedience factor
281
. Indeed article 24 is presented as the 
key aspect to understand the impact of political confessionalism
282
 because it presents 
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 Ó Tuathail, Gearóid et Al. Rethinking geopolitics‖, Routledge, Nueva York, 1998; Ó Tuathail, Gearóid et 
Al., Geopolitics Readers, Routledge, Nueva York, 2006; Doods, Klaus. Political Geography III: Critical 
Geopolitics after 10 Years, Progress in Human Geography, 25 (3), 2001. 
279
 Para profundizar sobre las nuevas formas que están asumiendo los estudios de la geopolítica critica, véase: 
Jones, Laura et Al., New directions in critical geopolitics: an introduction‖, GeoJournal, 75, 2010, pp. 315-325. 
280
 In the Senate, all religious communities have to be represented when the members of House of Deputies are 
no longer elected on a confessional basis (art. 22). 
281
Related to religious obedience we have to point out the incidence of well-known concept of spiritual families. 
Indeed, this concept is presented by the Article 22 of the Lebanese Constitution. This article would serve to 
justify and legally enshrine religious communities. This dimension of confessionalism that could brand as a 
politician, we should highlight the other side of confessionalism, the administrative type that would focus on the 
jurisdiction applicable to the personal status of each citizen. In fact, as can be deduced from Article 9 of the 
Constitution, the law of each community stands as the essential jurisdiction in relation to personal status of each 
person. Therefore, we can imagine the impact of this confessionalism on the private and daily life of Lebanese. 
This is important in order to understand the manipulation which is carried out by some political leaders in order 
to take advantage of this link based on identity. 
282
 The distribution of the seats of the House of Deputies or Parliament equally between Christians and Muslims 
and proportionally among each of them until such time as the House of Deputies has enacted an electoral law not 
on the basis of religious representation (art. 24). 
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equality between Christians and Muslims.In fact, of the 128 seats that the Lebanese 
parliament has, 64 are for Christian deputies, and the other 64 are for Muslim MPs.  
 In relation to this, we should highlight the article12 of the Lebanese constitution, 
which refers to the impact of the religious factor on the distribution of public jobs, stresses 
that the religious factor predominates. Regrettably, such a system promotes immobility and, 
inevitably, increases political clientelism. 
 Nevertheless, concerning the impact of confessionalism on the Lebanese political 
system we have to point out the fact that Lebanon has a patriarchal society. This issue is 
important to take it into account because it would justify individual obedience to the authority 
of the family and the community. For this reason, we have to analyze jointly the impact of 
confessionalism and communitarism. 
 An important aspect to keep in mind is related to the Ta‟ifAgreements, signed on 
October 22, 1989 in Ta‘if, Saudi Arabia and ratified by the Lebanese Parliament on 
November 5, 1989.These agreements were presented as a sorely needed emendation of the 
power-sharing mechanism introduced in 1943. It picked up the new confessional equilibrium 
where Shiite community was partially recognized, their aspirations to achieve a balance 
between population and their share of political representation.Shias were recognized before 
too.  What Ta‘if did was to introduce parity between Muslims and Christians, which the Shias 
reject.  They prefer the Thulathiyyah (trilateralism) in which Christians form a third, Sunnis a 
second third, and Shias the last third.  Such a system will erase the Ta‘if parity. Thus, after 
these agreements we have a new balance among the nineteen Lebanese communities. 
 In spite of this advance concerning the stability of the country, we have the incident of 
confessionalism without solution.  We still face one of the most important contradictions in 
the Constitution. In fact, this contradiction affects the new preamble of the Lebanese 
Constitution, where we can read "the abolition of political confessionalism is a vital national 
goal"
283
. But, what actually happens is that it is encouraging and justifying the intrusion of 
religious communities in the political game
284
. This issue, still without resolution, reflects 
what the 2005 Cedar Revolution attempted to address but, perhaps, left unfinished (Safa, 
2006:37).  
 Still, the impacts of the Ta‘if Agreements were of vital importance, but it must be 
acknowledged that its effectiveness has been undermined ever since the early 1990s. In fact, 
Ta‘if indicated the end of the civil war and the formulation of a new constitution for the 
Republic of Lebanon. The Ta‘if Agreements supposed the end of sectarian violence in 
Lebanon but failed to promote cooperation among the different Lebanese groups with respect 
to the restoration of sovereignty. The Ta‘if Agreements reinforced the principle of political 
confessionalism, because instead of strengthening government institutions, it allowed 
communities to strengthen their internal bonds by promoting sectarian ideology and 
commissioning practice of political clientelism, and further differentiated in relation to the 
other groups (Haddad, 2002:293). 
 Lebanon has proven effective to have an inability to govern itself, and this is not due 
to poor wording of its constitutional documents, but rather, to the failure and the ambiguities 
presented by its officials. Consequently, the Constitution was purposefully kept ambiguous, 
and the absence of a hierarchy of norms meant that Lebanon failed to create an authentic, as 
well as an effective rule of law. All this contributes to the political instability that seems 
chronic, that in turn, has been used by various insurgent movements operating in Lebanon. 
                                                          
283
The New Preamble of the Constitution was established by the constitutional law of 21/09/1991 in order to 
pick up the political principles established by the Ta‘if accords that were signed on November 5, 1989. 
284
Actually, Sovereignty is exercised by religious communities. In fact, we have 64 deputies Christians, and 
other 64 deputies Muslims. 
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 In any case, we have to pay attention to the link between confessionalism and the 
increase of sectarianism (Kota, 2012:103-104)
285
 and religious fundamentalism. Likewise, we 
have to analyze how the foreign intervention tries to reinforce the level of sectarianism and 
religious fundamentalism. Lebanon is a good case to analyze how the regional and 
international powers are using the different communities to display the corresponding 
influence on the Lebanese game board. In this sense, we could think that in Lebanon the 
positive attitude towards sectarianism means also to have positive attitude towards 
fundamentalism, trust only within the community, and being favorable related to the foreign 
intervention (Moaddel et Al., 2012: 27). 
 
The Geopolitics pressure from the Southern Flank: Hezbollah Versus State of Israel 
 When we want to ask about the relationship between Lebanon and Israel, there are 
many factors that, from a Geopolitical viewpoint, would display an important role. On one 
hand, we have to mention the type of border existing between these countries. In fact, if we 
accept the thesis of Agnew, who argues that borders makes the nation and not vice versa 
(Agnew, 2007b:399), we shall talk about the ―improvised states‖(Jeffrey, 2013:2). Indeed, the 
most probable changes of this border demonstrate that we are facing a "state improvised" due 
to the weak State and the problems of the Lebanese and Israeli governments to implement 
their respective quota of sovereignty over all the territory and population. In fact, we might 
ask in relation to Lebanon, if we are truly in front of a State or not, as the Lebanese state has 
neither the monopoly on the use of force, nor has it  the legitimation to act concerning its 
population. We also have to add the fact that the Lebanese government is not capable to carry 
out control over all the territory that makes up the Lebanese space. 
 According to the logic of Geopolitics small countries assume two stances: either a 
passive or an aggressive position.  In our case of study, Hezbollah and above all, Israel have 
carried out a considerable change for radical actions
286
. At this point, we can stress the 
importance of the religious factor. Indeed, if we take into consideration the confessional 
factor to be a normal factor, then the logic of conflict between both countries would make 
sense. Moreover, since Lebanon accounts on a multi confessional system, whereas the State 
of Israel accounts on an exclusive religious one. The importance of Critical Geopolitics  
becomes clearer given that we could explain the relations between these two actors according 
to the distribution of power based on ideological factors. 
 Another element to take into consideration is related to the Palestinian cause and the 
entire Arab-Israeli conflict
287
. Indeed, this conflict has unfortunately marked the history of 
Lebanon. In fact, we could say that the settlement of Palestinian Fedayeen in the Lebanese 
territory since 1948 has been used as a political pretext by Israel to carry out a series of 
reprisals, and two great invasions, which took place in 1978 and 1982. The settlements of 
Palestinians, predominantly Sunnis in Lebanon, and in which certain radical jihadist groups 
operate, such as Fatah Al Islam, come to form about 10% of the Lebanese population. The 
different Palestinian refugee‘s camps appear as one of the main focal points of instability for 
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 Dr. Suechita Kota pointed out the existence of three kind of Sectrarianism: Firstly, we would find the 
sectarian identity due to the clientelism mentality and mutural distrust among the sectarian groups. Secondly, we 
could talk about sectarian practice based on the political Elites behavior, and finally, we shall talk concerning the 
sectarian as an institution due to the strong link between confessionalism and the Lebanese political System.  Dr. 
Suechita Kota stressed the interaction among these three kinds of sectarism. In no way, these types are mutually 
exclusive.  
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 Since January 2013, Israel bombarded Syrian territory in three occasions. The latest attack took place on May 
5, when they bombarded an arsenal located at west of Damascus, where it seemed that they were a series of 
missiles, of Iranian origin, ready to be transferred and delivered to the Shiite militia of Hezbollah . 
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 In Lebanon when the conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis was internalize, the country set up, at 
this moment, the first stone for its civil war (from 1975 till 1990). 
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Israel. This problem must be contextualized like one of the most influential sources of 
instability operating in the country. Therefore, the settlement of the Palestinian refugee‘s 
camps distributed throughout Lebanon, for its location, and taking into account the faith of 
the community that predominates in each zone, will allow us to point out, that the Palestinian 
cause will still be one of the most important elements of destabilization in relation to the 
Lebanese constant precarious stability. 
 Without any doubt, Hezbollah is one of the most important threats for Israel‘s security 
and Defense. In fact, Hezbollah, or Party of God appears nowadays as the face of Arab 
resistance against Israel. Till now three armed conflicts have been registered between the 
State of Israel and Hezbollah in 1982, 2000 and in 2006.  
 Hezbollah is more than a simple political party. It can be classified as a terrorist 
group, Islamic religious movement, Lebanese national party, or a puppet in the hands of Iran 
and Syria (Samaan, 2007:7).It can also be all of these things simultaneously. At the same 
time, we can consider that we are talking about one important social movement which 
represents the stronger insurgency movement in Lebanon. We also have to point out that 
Hezbollah had decided to increase its efforts on the political arena, which would count against 
its insurgency activities. 
 Regardless of Hezbollah‘s origins which presented its militia and political party as a 
formation that sought to achieve higher levels of representation and power for the Shiite 
community due to its population growth during the 80s and 90s. Nowadays, Hezbollah has 
emerged as the largest community within the mosaic of communities that is present on the 
Lebanese scene; besides the legitimacy it was granted as a result of its victory against Israel 
in the 2006 war.  
 Today, the image of resistance used in a biased way has deteriorated as a consequence 
of its participation in the war of Syria. Despite of signing the ―Baabda Declaration‖, where 
the Lebanese political forces pushed for dissociation in relation to any kind of conflict or 
crisis that can be displayed in any Arab country, Hezbollah did not keep its pledges and began 
sending troops and technical assistance forces to the regime of Bashar Assad. In this way, the 
Shiite militia breached again another national agreement. 
 We have to point out that he Shiite community is mainly located in the south and in 
the north of the country. This distribution affects Beirut, where Hezbollah has a considerable 
military capability, and which gives the party the chance to control all the geopolitical 
dynamics registered on Lebanese soil. Therefore, we will continue analyzing the day by day, 
in order to devise whether Hezbollah is going to continue improving its arsenal, due in part to 
aid dispensed by Iran and Syria. Another factor to follow is concerning its transformation in 
terms of expansive and aggressive impulses that present this militia in relation to the State of 
Israel. We should not forget that its main goal is to eliminate Zionism completely. 
 In the management of this border, we have to pay attention to the role that the United 
Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has been playing in the area. Had it not been for 
UNIFIL the period of relative stability and safety which we are living nowadays would have 
been impossible. However, there are a few more points to take into consideration when we 
analyze the conflict between the State of Israel and Hezbollah.  For instance, we have to point 
out the problem of the ―Golan Heights‖ and ―Shebaa Farms‖. Both areas are still pending of 
being resolved concerning which country has sovereignty and where Hezbollah can play an 
important role in relation to the security and defense of Lebanon, Israel and Syria. 
 The ―Golan Heights‖ and the problem of the ―Shebaa farms‖ area present a significant 
challenge to Lebanese security affairs
288. As a result of Hezbollah‘s involvement in the war of 
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 The Golan Heights are occupied by Israel since ―the Six Day War‖ in 1967, and then again, from the "Yom 
Kippur War" in 1973. This plateau is located among Israel, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. The Golan Heights is 
presented from a geostrategic viewpoint as a cornerstone due to what can happen in the War of Syria. If the 
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Syria, its leader Hasan Nasrallah delivered a clear and explicit message in relation to the 
support that Hezbollah is going to offer to Bashar El Assad regime‘s forces in order to 
recover the Golan Heights for Syria, a commitment which increases the possibility of fresh 
confrontations at two levels. On one hand, we can witness an interstate conflict between 
Lebanon and Israel. In fact, for Israel the security control of the Golan Heights is presented of 
vital importance, not only for military reasons, but because 35% of the supply aquifer of 
Israel comes from that area. From a military viewpoint, in addition to this control and if Israel 
could penetrate into southern Lebanon, Israel will have two fronts to attack Syria (Seaver, 
2000: 260). Thus, this factor will involve a rise of the tension level among Lebanon, Israel 
and Syria.   On the other hand, it is possible to notice an intrastate conflict among the Shiite 
community and the Sunni and/or Salafist communities. In the attempt to recover the Golan 
Heights, it is likely to think that Hezbollah is going to face a fierce resistance from these 
communities.  
 Another actor to take into consideration is the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which is 
composed, in its majority, by Syrian Sunni rebel groups and Lebanese Sunni and Salafist 
rebel groups coming from Lebanon. These groups are operational on Syrian soil and it could 
be seen how some forces belonging to the Palestinian and Syrians refugees‘ camps could 
fight against Hezbollah on the border with Israel. On Lebanese territory it is equally likely 
that this conflict can also be registered in the border areas with Syria and the Bekaa Valley. 
Regarding the southern flank it could indicate that it is more than likely that clashes can be 
sawn in the most important cities of the south of Lebanon like Saida and Tyre, between 
Hezbollah‘s supporters and followers of the "Assiri movement‖, led by the Sunni Salafist 
leader Sheikh Ahmed Al Assir. 
 At this moment in time, an important increase in the climate of confrontation has been 
observed. This issue is backed by what is happening in Syria because it could be used to 
spark off a new armed conflict between Israel and the Shiite militia. In this sense, we should 
emphasize other elements that are increasing the climate of tension in that area. For example, 
we would have to highlight what is happening in the ―Golan Heights‖ where the United 
Nations Force Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) is missing components after the 
withdrawal of Croatian soldiers, and soon the same will happen with the Austrians 
contingent. This issue coupled with recent Hezbollah threats, best expressed in the intention 
to help Bashar al-Assad‘s forces to recover the Golan Heights, certainly compromises the 
safety of the whole area. In this sense, we have to stress on the importance of this area 
because if finally Hezbollah could recuperate it for Syria, the Shia militia could make a 
corridor making a kind of Shia belt. As a result of this Shia corridor, Israel would increase its 
level of insecurity because Hezbollah would have a better position to attack it. 
 Another factor that is increasing the climate of tension results from continued 
violations of the Lebanese airspace by the Israeli Air Force. Lebanese authorities are 
powerless against this nearly daily breach of their airspace given inadequate defense 
capabilities. Even worse, Lebanese airspace, but, in certain cases, breaches in maritime 
boundaries as well, place UNIFIL forces in a difficult situation. The feeling of humiliation 
and ineffectiveness which UNIFIL is subjected to concerning the actions of Israel and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
armed forces of Bashar al-Assad‘s with the help of Hezbollah are capable to recover this plateau, Hezbollah 
could set a kind of corridor up, and that would connect the Golan area with the south of Lebanon under Shiite 
community control. Of this way, it would create a kind of common and united front to strengthen Hezbollah, in 
relation to its position and pressure control over their natural enemy, Israel. For this to occur, Hezbollah should 
recover the area of the Shebaa farms, which it is also under control of Israel, as a result of its victory in the "Six 
Days War". Over this area, there is a dispute regarding its sovereignty. This problem is affecting to Syria and 
Lebanon. In this sense, we will have to see if its traditional alliance with Hamas (Sunni), due to the fact that they 
share the same enemy, will continue or by the contrary it is going to deteriorate as a result of sectarian strife 
existing today between Sunni and Shiite respectively. 
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Hezbollah forces requires on one hand, the expansion and improvement of the functions of its 
mandate, and on the other hand, an improvement regarding the number of troops deployed to 
enhance its own military capabilities.  
 Of course, lack of coordination between UNIFIL contingents and the Lebanese Armed 
Forces hinder the situation because the European Union (EU) has included Hezbollah on its 
list of terrorist organizations. It is more than likely that if this initiative succeeds, there will be 
a substantial increase of attacks against UNIFIL forces. 
 To summarize, we have to point out the importance of the settlements of Palestinian 
and Syrian refugees because it would appear a more than likely conflict between the Sunni 
community and the Shia community led by Hezbollah. The traditional areas under control of 
Hezbollah can be threatened by the increase of Sunni community as a result of the increasing 
number of these refugees. Furthermore, we have to follow day by day what is happening in 
the Syrian war because Hezbollah is playing its own future there. 
 
The Geopolitics pressure from the Syrian War 
 There can be little doubt that Lebanese stability is being compromised by what is 
happening in Syria. The Syrian war has become a transnational conflict where the 
participation of the Shiite militia of Hezbollah is compromising Lebanese security. As 
discussed above, Hezbollahmay be paying a historic debt to Syria because of the latter‘s 
political, military, and logistical support in its decades-old resistance against Israel. This 
participation would justify the need to defend the ―axis of resistance‖, that is compounded by 
Iran, Syria and Hezbollah and appears to be a clear example of increased hostilities between 
Sunni radicalism and Shiite fundamentalism in the context of the destabilizing that the region 
is going through. 
 In this sense, we cannot forget the strong relationship existing between Syria and 
Lebanon
289
. Indeed, the Lebanese political system rests on two major coalitions of political 
parties. Both coalitions are organized around the kind of influence Syria could exert on 
Lebanon. This way, we can find on one hand, the "March 14
th
 Alliance," which is contrary to 
any political interference or influence by Syria. On the other hand, we can find the "March 8
th
 
Alliance", which involves, for example, Hezbollah, and that it focuses on protecting Syrian 
interests in Lebanon. This group of political parties conceives Lebanon as a natural extension 
of Syria. In fact, together both would form the ―Greater Syria". The whole process of 
interference and control, over the Lebanese political reality by Syria, had its peak during the 
period when Syria imposed a protectorate over Lebanon, which allowed it to strengthen its 
control over the country of the cedars in all the spheres of public life, including the 
rearmament of the Shiite militia of Hezbollah. 
 In addition, due to the instability and disorganization that Lebanon has displayed since 
its birth, Syria was able to improve its control and influence on the Lebanese chessboard. 
Syria's role as a "big brother" is becoming increasingly clear, and it makes us think that the 
war of Syria is taking place also on Lebanese soil. In fact, what is happening in Tripoli, and 
more specifically, in Bab al Tabane (mostly Sunni) and Jabal Mohsen (which concentrates the 
minority Alawite) is a true reproduction in Lebanese territory of the clashes that are taking 
place in the Syrian war. 
 In any case, the participation of Hezbollah forces in the Syrian war has provoked the 
prompt reaction on behalf of the Free Syrian Army (FSA). In fact, this rebel group has 
attacked some positions inside Lebanese soil at Arsal and throughout  the Akkar region.  Both 
are located in the north abutting the Bekaa Valley, which compounds one of the hottest spots 
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Lebanonand Syria have already signed severalcooperation agreementsamong which we wouldhighlight on one 
hand, the Treatyof Friendship andCooperation signedin May 1991. On the other hand, the Agreement of 
Security and Defense signed in Septemberof that year. 
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in the north of the country. In this case, we cannot forget that Arsal is an area controlled by 
Sunnis within an area mostly controlled by Hezbollah. The geographical area close to the 
border with Syria comes as a geographical space where it performs a fratricidal insurgency. 
Moreover, the existence of diffuse boundaries and lack of control make it very easy to 
penetrate in these natural boundaries which have become a perfect area for weapons 
trafficking, ammunition, movement of soldiers, displaced refugees, illegal drugs, etc ..., 
which are being used by Hezbollah, the Free Syrian Army, some Sunni groups
290
 and 
brigades linked to Al Qaeda fighting against the regime of Bashar Al Assad. Therefore, the 
Bekaa area is still presented as a risky area where the influence of Syria in relation to 
Lebanon can still be felt since the period between 1976 and 2005, also known as 
"Syirianization". In fact, during this period there was a significant presence of Syrian troops 
in the region, as well as statues of Bashar El Assad family members and giant portraits of the 
Syrian leader Hafez El Assad in areas like Chtaura and Baalbek (Bennafla, 2008:8). As a 
result of the Syrian domination the presence of the Lebanese Shia groups as Amal and 
Hezbollah was possible in certain areas as Baalbek and Hermel. 
 Therefore, if we describe the world in terms of territorial struggle, religion could be 
used to give legitimacy to such conflict. In this sense, we should highlight the fact that in 
general, trahe entities that blend geopolitics and religion are non-state actors, as it could be 
the case of Hezbollah, which does not have a clear geopolitical vision, because all that they 
want is to expel that does not of an area those who do not share a particular version of Islam. 
That is why, the religious factor even if it is not the main cause of the conflict itself, gains in 
importance once at territorial conflict starts. The entire northern region could thus be used as 
a clear example in which religion propels a struggle over territory. 
 All the border between Lebanon and Syria are configured as a conflictual space in 
which a kind of network could be established, where you could identify a whole range of 
complex interactions between a multitude of actors (Bashar‘s regime forces, the Free Syrian 
Army (ESL), Alawite community, Sunni and  Shia communities, radical jihadists, related to 
Al Qaeda cells as Fatah al-Islam in Lebanon area, and Jabhat al-Nusra on the Syrian territory, 
transnational rebels
291
, etc ... This fragmentation of actors is presented as a fundamental 
challenge for two reasons. The first to guarantee the restoration of peace, and the second to 
explain whatever motivations, which may lead a particular group to participate in this armed 
conflict. 
 This conflictual space would understand the war as the result of political decisions 
made within a context where several states share a border, and where this fact offers limited 
opportunities for economic relations, political alliances, rivalries, and existing cultural ties 
(Flint et Al., 2009:829). The issue of alliances and rivalries, as refer to techniques, are vitally 
important to understand the extent and the level of increase of the conflict through the 
phenomenon of contagion. In this sense, and for the present case, the alliance between Bashar 
al-Assad‘s regime and Hezbollah could be interpreted as a network of relationships that have 
the ability to unite different geographical areas of different countries based on an identity and 
collective action in order to share the same preferences and respond to the same political 
incentives. 
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 Free Syrian Army, Syrian Liberation Front and Syrian Islamic Front. 
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 When we are talking about transnational rebel groups, we would be talking about those rebels who not only 
act on its territory but deliberately cross borders, often without authorization of the second country involved. Its 
activity is enhanced by the fact that the regular armed forces of the countries involved are not able to control 
their insurgent activity. For the present case we have to emphasize the idea of operational deficit presenting the 
Lebanese Armed Forces. In fact, the presence of these forces, although are recorded in the city of Tripoli, are 
almost nonexistent on the border area that stand in an area without control. 
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Conclusions: Medium and long terms Geopolitical trends 
 In response to current events and using emotions geopolitics as a way to apply the 
modus operandi of critical geopolitics, we could include Lebanon, as well as other Arab 
countries, within the category of a ―culture of humiliation‖. In fact, it is mostly due to the 
showing of impotence relative to the control of their present and their own future in the 
medium and long term. Indeed, there are many factors that have influence on and play a 
special role in the Lebanese checkerboard.  Concerning these factors, we would highlight the 
preponderance of communalism, sectarianism, foreign interventionism, state and institutional 
weakness, potentially conflicting neighbors, triumph of particularism of national interest , 
failure of Power-Sharing as a political mechanism, frequent practice of political patronage 
based on certain neo feudal structures, leadership of the political game by "warlords" and an 
increased in religious fanaticism and extremism. In relation to these factors, I am convinced 
that its impacts will be increased when the Syrian war ends, and we will be able to observe 
how a new intercommunity equilibrium will rise in Syria and Lebanon. In addition, as a result 
of the incidence of porous borders, it will be possible to notice an increase of the presence of 
Al Qaeda cells on Lebanese soil. 
 The Geopolitical developments that are going to take place in Lebanon, over the 
medium and long term, will be determined by the new religious balance to be recorded in the 
region as a consequence of the end of Bashar‘s regime. In this sense, we could point out that 
the downfall of Bashar‘s regime would put Hezbollah in a total isolation because it would 
break the ―axis of resistance‖. Moreover, Syria will become a tough opponent to Iran because 
most probably we will have a Sunni republic. This issue will be translated in a rise of tension 
between Sunnis and Shiites. In fact, I believe that we will have a Sunni Islamist regime so 
much in Syria as in Lebanon in response to the new confessional equilibrium registered once 
the war ends. 
 Concerning the role of UNIFIL, we have to indicate that it is more than likely to see 
its tenure and responsibility increased in the Lebanese theatre of operations. In this sense, we 
cannot dismiss the notion that UNIFIL may have to expand its range of operations, and 
increase their participation in the management of the northern border between Syria and 
Lebanon. Therefore, it is presented as condition sine qua non to provide UNIFIL with the 
military, economic and logistical resources that this mission really deserves. 
 Syria in the post-Bashar Al Assad era is likely to have a ―National Pact‖ based on the 
Power-Sharing political mechanism just like the one practiced in Lebanon. We will have to 
see then, whether the new Syrian system will be able to handle the management of minority 
communities that coexist in Syria at this moment. 
 Besides, we can realize internally, the lack of political reforms due to the 
incompetence of the Lebanese State and the effect of religious communalism. This 
confessioanlism puts on top the particularistic interests over the Lebanese national interest. 
This issue will continue to demonstrate that we are facing a "State improvised", due to weak 
institutions and the problems of the Lebanese state to implement its sovereignty over all its 
territory and population. In fact, we might ask if we are truly analyzing a State or not, as the 
Lebanese State has neither a monopoly on use of force, nor the legitimacy to act in relation to 
the whole population, nor exercises control over all the territory that compounds the Lebanese 
space. 
 Geopolitical forces will continue to exert pressure on Lebanon from all its 
geostrategic flanks, especially because of its location and the distribution of power among its 
different communities. Thus, we will continue to record the current major geopolitical trends 
because of the fact that different communities and denominations continue making the future 
political developments in this country, and the increase of interventions at household level 
and interference by the local, national, regional and international actors. 
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 The issue of the Lebanese geographic location provides this country with a very 
complicated neighborhood, which creates an ideal environment for the installation of a 
permanent structural crisis. This pessimistic landscape would only be resolved through 
intervention and protection by external powers. Thus, as Zahar argues, in Lebanon the Peace 
has lasted only when there have been foreign protectors (Zahar, 2005:219-240). So at the end, 
we will have to see if Lebanon will continue resisting or not, the triumph of a geopolitical 
clash of civilizations, and the hegemonic ambitions showed by foreign powers interested in 
managing its affairs. 
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